This paper proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders. The auctioneer announces a vector of current prices, bidders report back quantities demanded at these prices, and the auctioneer adjusts the prices. Units are credited to bidders at the current prices as their opponents' demands decline, and the process continues until every commodity market clears.
1
In earlier work (Ausubel, 1997 (Ausubel, , 2000 , I proposed an efficient ascending auction design for multiple homogeneous items. In environments where bidders have pure private values and diminishing marginal values, this dynamic auction yields outcomes coinciding with that of the (sealed-bid) Vickrey (1961) auction, but offers advantages of simplicity, transparency and privacy preservation. Moreover, in some environments where bidders have interdependent values for the items, this dynamic auction continues to yield efficient outcomes and thus outperforms even the Vickrey auction.
However, situations abound in diverse industries in which heterogeneous (but related) commodities are auctioned. On a typical Monday, the U.S. Treasury sells in excess of $10 billion in threemonth bills and $10 billion in six-month bills.
1 Current practice is to auction the three-month and sixmonth bills separately in two independent sealed-bid auctions. In the European UMTS/IMT-2000 spectrum auctions, governments sold both paired and unpaired 3G spectrum, located at similar frequencies but apparently exhibiting markedly different values. Some governments auctioned these together in fixed bundles, while other governments auctioned the paired spectrum followed by the (less valuable) unpaired spectrum. In the quarterly Electricité de France (EDF) generation capacity auctions that began in 2001, EDF sells base-load electricity contracts and peak-load electricity contracts, of five different durations each, simultaneously in one dynamic auction procedure.
The current paper proposes an efficient dynamic auction method for heterogeneous items. The starting point for the new design is a venerable trading procedure, often associated in general equilibrium theory with the fictitious Walrasian auctioneer, and sometimes implemented in modern times as an ascending clock auction. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of heterogeneous commodities among n bidders. The auctioneer announces a price vector, p, and bidders respond by reporting the quantity vectors that they wish to transact at these prices. The auctioneer then calculates the excess demand, and increases or decreases each component of the price vector according as the excess demand is positive or negative (Walrasian tâtonnement). This iterative process continues until a price vector is reached at which excess demand is zero, and trades occur only at the final price vector.
In both the fictitious Walrasian auctioneer construct and in real-world ascending clock auctions, bidders' payments are linear in the quantities awarded: if bidder i wins quantity vector i q in an auction with final price vector p, bidder i pays i p q ⋅ . Unfortunately, a strategic agent who faces linear prices in the auction then possesses an incentive to underreport her true demand at the announced prices, and this incentive increases in her market share. This is most straightforwardly seen in the case of homogeneous goods (i.e., K = 1), where there is a growing body of both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence.
(See detailed discussions for sealed-bid auctions in Ausubel and Cramton, 1996 , and for ascending auctions in Ausubel, 1997.) Consequently, when agents have market power, the Walrasian auction procedure typically does not result in Walrasian outcomes. The current paper circumvents this problem by extending and generalizing an approach introduced in Ausubel (1997) : units are credited to bidders at the current prices whenever the opposing bidders' demands decline. Specified properly, this nonlinear pricing rule restores the incentive for strategic bidders to bid as price-takers, yielding efficient outcomes even when bidders have market power.
2
One of the objectives of the current paper is, thus, to provide both a solution to an outstanding theoretical auction question and a new practical auction design. In a recent article, Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997, pp. 405-406) ask:
"Do there exist simple market mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms that assign a price to each object) which efficiently allocate multiple indivisible objects when market clearing prices exist? … Whether there are simple incentive compatible market mechanisms which converge to a competitive equilibrium (whenever one exists) under the more general condition that buyers may want to consume more than one object is an open question."
Meanwhile, Gul and Stacchetti (2000, p. 69) conclude the Introduction of their recent article by stating:
"More importantly, we show that no dynamic auction can reveal sufficient information to implement the Vickrey mechanism if all Gross Substitutes preferences are allowed. Thus, the unit demand case of Demange et al. [1986] and the multiple homogeneous goods case of Ausubel [1997] are the most general environments for which generalizations of the English auction can be used to implement efficient, strategy-proof allocations."
3
In this paper, I will put forth an affirmative answer to Bikhchandani and Mamer's question, while disagreeing with the spirit (but not the letter) of Gul and Stacchetti's conclusion. A simple market mechanism is provided: the auctioneer announces price vectors, bidders are asked to respond with their naïve demands, and there is no benefit to bidders from strategizing further. Moreover, the dynamic mechanism economizes on information in the sense that bidders need only to report their demands at a one-dimensional set of price vectors, and it maintains privacy in the sense that bidders avoid the need to report demands at prices above the market-clearing prices. While the answer provided here may 2 The extension of an efficient dynamic auction to K ≥ 2 commodities poses at least two significant obstacles. First, unlike in the homogeneous goods case, a bidder may now wish to increase her demand for a given commodity along the path toward equilibrium, as prices of substitute commodities increase. Thus, units that once appeared to be "clinched" by another bidder may later be "unclinched", and the auction rules need to reflect this scenario. Second, K simultaneous auctions are effectively conducted, and it is unclear how the progress of one auction should affect the clinching of units in another. Surprisingly, this paper establishes that it suffices to independently calculate the crediting of different commodities; the only formal interaction among the K auctions needs to occur through the simultaneous bidding and the price adjustment rule. With these obstacles resolved, an efficient dynamic auction design for heterogeneous commodities emerges.
superficially appear to be in conflict with Gul and Stacchetti's conclusion, there is no formal conflict with their theorems. 4 Indeed, the elegant analysis of Gul and Stacchetti is utilized as a needed input into the current analysis. Nevertheless, my interpretation of the current results is opposite to Gul and Stacchetti's conclusion. The economic environment of multiple heterogeneous commodities is apparently amenable to a generalization of the English auction that can be used to implement efficient, strategy-proof allocations.
5
The current paper will also seek to offer a modern perspective on the Walrasian auctioneer.
Indeed, economists have long been hostile toward this modeling device. Arrow (1959, p. 43) notes at once the motivation for the fictitious auctioneer and the logical problem he creates: "It is not explained whose decision it is to change prices in accordance with [Walrasian tâtonnement]. Each individual participant in the economy is supposed to take prices as given and determine his choices as to purchases and sales accordingly; there is no one left over whose job it is to make a decision on price." Arrow and Hahn (1971, p. 322) elaborate that the auctioneer and perfect competition together produce "the paradoxical problem that a perfect competitor changes prices that he is supposed to take as given."
The current research suggests one way out of the paradox. Instead of an implicit fictitious auctioneer, consider an explicit auction mechanism that uses Walrasian tâtonnement for price adjustment and uses the payment rule proposed in this paper. Then, economic agents -even though conscious that they can and do change prices -find it in their interest to take prices as given at every moment and to report their true demands relative to the current prices. As a result, the auction reaches the same Walrasian allocation of goods as if agents were price takers and the fictitious auctioneer were present -however, the agents' payment are generally lower than in the Walrasian model. Thus, the current paper relates to a variety of strands of the literature. First, it connects most directly with several recent papers seeking to extend or explain my analysis in Ausubel (1997) . Perry and Reny (2001) adapt my ascending-bid design to more general environments of homogeneous goods with interdependent values. Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2001a,b) and Bikhchandani et al. (2001) formulate the auction problem as a linear programming problem and reinterpret my homogeneous goods design as a primal-dual algorithm. makes a first attempt to extend the design from homogeneous to 4 The precise statement of Theorem 6 of Gul and Stacchetti (2000) only excludes implementing literally the Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) outcome by an auction in which price traces a single ascending trajectory. By contrast, for the case of substitutes, Theorems 2 and 2′ of the current paper yield the outcome of a modified VCG mechanism using a single ascending trajectory, while Theorems 4 and 4′ of the current paper yield literally the VCG outcome using potentially n distinct ascending trajectories generated in parallel. Hence, the conflict herein is only with Gul and Stacchetti's interpretation, and not literally with their theorem. 5 The modified VCG mechanism is also a Clarke-Groves mechanism, and so it is also strategy-proof. However, payoffs differ from the standard VCG payoffs by an additive term that depends on other bidders' reports. If the additive term is positive, the modified VCG mechanism may violate a voluntary participation constraint. If the additive term is negative, the modified VCG mechanism will yield lower expected revenues than the VCG mechanism. Thus, there are advantages to obtaining the standard VCG payoffs, but doing so incurs the cost of using the parallel auction procedure with n distinct ascending trajectories.
heterogeneous goods. Second, this paper relates to the literature on efficient auction design. This includes the classic work of Vickrey (1961) , Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) , who provide static dominantstrategy mechanisms for private values settings, as well as recent papers examining the possibility or impossibility of efficient mechanisms with interdependent values, including Maskin (1992 ), Ausubel (1999 , Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) , Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Perry and Reny (2002) . Third, this paper also relates to the literature exploring Walrasian equilibrium in auction environments with discrete goods. This includes the early work of Kelso and Crawford (1982) , as well as recent work by Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) , Stacchetti (1999, 2000) and Milgrom (2000) . Fourth, this paper relates to the literature exploring dynamic package bidding -rather than the clock auction -as an approach to auctioning heterogeneous items, papers such as Banks, Ledyard and Porter (1989), Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) , and Parkes and Ungar (2002) .
Finally, the current paper connects with the venerable literature on tâtonnement stability and price adjustment processes, which seeks to understand the forces operating in an economy that may drive it toward an equilibrium. The most famous early attempt to treat convergence to equilibrium was made by Walras (1874) . Classical results include articles by Arrow, Block and Hurwicz (1959) , who demonstrate the global stability of Walrasian tâtonnement under the assumption of gross substitutes, and Scarf (1960) , who provides (non-substitutes) counterexamples for which Walrasian tâtonnement fails to converge from any starting point other than the equilibria. Hahn (1982) provides a nice survey of the classical literature on tâtonnement stability. Indeed, one way to view the current paper is that it introduces a methodology enabling the economist to convert competitive results on tâtonnement stability into game-theoretic results involving strategic agents. It is hoped that the methodology may ultimately enable us to import significant portions of the existing literature on stability of price adjustment processes into a strategic framework.
The paper examines two economic environments, each containing bidders with quasilinear utilities and pure private values. In the first environment, the commodities are perfectly divisible. Price is adjusted as a differential equation using the classic specification of Walrasian tâtonnement and bidders submit bids in continuous time. Surprisingly, it is unnecessary to assume that bidders display substitutes preferences; strictly concave utility functions are sufficient for obtaining the following results in a continuous environment. If a bidder's opponents bid sincerely, then the bidder's payoff is path independent and equals a constant translation of social surplus at the final allocation (Lemma 2), implying that the bidder maximizes her payoff by bidding sincerely (Theorem 1). Hence, sincere bidding by every bidder is an equilibrium, yielding a Walrasian price vector and an efficient allocation (Theorem 2). With appropriate choice of the initial price, it yields exactly the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payoff to a given bidder (Theorem 3). Finally, a procedure for n parallel auctions is provided which yields exactly the VCG payoff to all n bidders (Theorem 4).
In the second environment, the commodities are discrete. Then it becomes necessary to assume that agents have substitutes preferences; otherwise, Walrasian prices might fail to exist (see Kelso and Crawford, 1982 , Bikhchandani and Mamer, 1997 , Gul and Stacchetti, 1999 , and Milgrom, 2000 .
Adjusting prices using a variation on Gul and Stacchetti's (2000) adaptation of Walrasian tâtonnement to discrete commodities, Theorems 1′-4′ (analogous to Theorems 1-4) obtain. The sincere bidding equilibrium survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies and, with incomplete information and a "full support" assumption, it is the unique outcome of iterated weak dominance (Theorem 5′). Moreover, since prices only ascend along the adjustment path, the auction design exhibits the same advantage of privacy preservation as in the homogeneous goods case.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 illustrates the new dynamic auction. Section 2 specifies the model. Sections 3 and 4 develop the auction in generality. Sections 5 and 6 prove theorems for the continuous environment. Section 7 specifies and proves theorems for the discrete environment.
Section 8 offers two approximations to the full n parallel auctions procedure. Section 9 concludes.
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFICIENT DYNAMIC AUCTION
We illustrate the new dynamic auction procedure for heterogeneous commodities using an example in which K = 2. There are two types of commodities, denoted A and B. Real-world examples fitting this description may include the sale of three-month and six-month Treasury bills, the sale of paired and unpaired telecommunications spectrum, or the sale of base-load and peak-load electricity. Suppose that there are n = 3 bidders and let the supply vector equal (10,8). The auctioneer initially announces a price vector of p 1 = (3,4), and subsequently adjusts the price vector to p 2 = (4,5), p 3 = (5,7), p 4 = (6,7), and finally p 5 = (7,8). The bidders' quantities demanded at these price vectors are shown in by crediting 1 unit of commodity A at a price of 4 and 0 units of commodity B at a price of 5, to Bidder 3.
The process continues as the price vector advances. One interesting moment occurs when the price advances from p 3 = (5,7) to p 4 = (6,7). Observe that Bidder 3's demand vector changes from (4,1) to (3,2), while the other bidders' demand vectors remain constant. In particular, Bidder 3's demand for commodity B increases, meaning that 1 fewer unit of commodity B remains available for Bidders 1 and 2.
Consequently, the auction algorithm needs to take this literally, by debiting 1 unit of commodity B at the current price of 7 from each of Bidders 1 and 2.
The entire progression of units credited and debited is summarized in At p 5 = (7,8), supply and demand are now in balance for both commodities. Thus, p 5 becomes the final price. Bidders 1, 2 and 3 receive their quantity vectors of (4,2), (3,4) and (3,2), respectively, demanded at the final price. Observe that, for each bidder, the quantity vector demanded at the final price equals the sum of all units credited or debited along the way. However, since many of the credits and debits occurred at earlier prices, bidders' payments do not generally equal their final demands evaluated at the final prices. Rather, the bidders' payments are related to those from the VCG mechanism, justifying the sincere bidding assumed in this section by making it incentive compatible.
THE MODEL
A seller wishes to allocate units of each of K heterogeneous commodities among a set of n bidders, 
(A3) Monotonicity: The function :
(A4) Concavity: The function :
(A5) Continuity: The function :
The price vector will be denoted by 
Observe that (as will be the case when we strengthen (A4) to assume strictly concave utility in Sections 5 and 6, 6 More precisely, convexity will be assumed when considering the divisible commodities model emphasized in Sections 5 and 6; obviously, convexity in K ! will not be assumed for the discrete commodities model studied in Section 7, since then
In addition, to avoid arcane difficulties, it is assumed that the consumption sets of the bidders and the available supply S of commodities are such that there exists a feasible allocation of S among all the bidders and, for each i, there exists a feasible allocation of S among the bidders j i ≠ .
below), then we may also refer to the solution of Eq. (2) 
closed and concave (Rockafellar, 1970, Thm. 12 .2 and p. 308). We have:
i.e., x is a subgradient of i V at p if and only if −x is an element of bidder i's true demand correspondence at p (Rockafellar, 1970, Thm. 23.5) . Note that Eq. (3) is merely a general version of ( ) ( )
Roy's identity as restricted to quasilinear utility. To see this, consider the case where ( ) i U # is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave. Then demand is a continuously differentiable function,
With every time t ∈ [0,∞), we associate a price vector p(t), and each bidder i selects a bid ( )
We say that bidder i bids sincerely if her bid always belongs to her true demand correspondence:
Sincere Bidding. 8 Bidder i is said to bid sincerely relative to utility function
Next, we define two notions of efficient outcomes for this auction environment, the first taken from general equilibrium theory and the second taken from game theory: 
The VCG payoffs (if reports are truthful) are the payoffs
Assumptions ( Finally, we define a modification of the VCG mechanism that will be useful in characterizing the outcomes of the auction proposed in this paper. It is somewhat related to the notion of a Vickrey auction with a reserve price discussed in Ausubel and Cramton (1999) : 
:
The modified VCG mechanism with price of p (0) W − calculates social surplus absent bidder i, but it discards the supply constraint and instead assumes that commodities are available in arbitrary supply at a social cost of p(0). Similar to the regular VCG mechanism, the modified mechanism awards bidder i exactly the difference between these two surplus calculations. As will be emphasized in Theorem 3 below, if p(0) happens to be chosen such that the market absent bidder i clears (i.e., ( (0))
then bidder i's modified VCG payoff coincides with her regular VCG payoff.
3. "CLINCHING" VERSUS "CREDITING AND DEBITING"
In Ausubel (1997 Ausubel ( , 2000 , I introduced the notion of "clinching" for auctions of homogeneous goods. In the current notation, this corresponds to the case of K = 1, and so our various quantity and price vectors temporarily reduce to scalars. Let the auction start at p(0) = 0 and clear at p(T) = T. Let:
and define the payment, ( ) i y T , of bidder i by the following Stieltjes integral:
Eq. (5) has the simple interpretation that, every time t it becomes a foregone conclusion that bidder i will win additional units of the homogeneous good, she wins them at the current price p(t 
The principal difference between the original notion of "clinching" in Eqs. (4)- (5) , so decreases and increases in opponents' demands are treated completely symmetrically, allowing both "crediting" and "debiting" to occur. Nevertheless, the differences should not be overstated. Suppose that, in an ascending auction of homogeneous goods, we replace Eqs. (4)- (5) with Eq. (6), and we choose p(0) so that
. Then the central result from Ausubel (1997) continues to hold: sincere bidding by all bidders is an equilibrium. Thus, reformulating the payoffs need not disturb incentive compatibility.
THE EXTENSION TO K HETEROGENEOUS COMMODITIES
The most naïve way that one might think about generalizing the homogeneous goods procedure to the case of K heterogeneous commodities is to run K price clocks (one for each commodity) simultaneously, to compute the "credits" and "debits" for each independently, and to sum them up. Let the movement of the K price clocks be described by a continuous, piecewise smooth, 10 vector-valued
, which is constrained to be of bounded variation in each component k. Then the naïve extension of Eq. (6) would be to define
, for k = 1, …, K, and to define payments by:
where the integrals of Eq. (7) x p x p ∂ ∂ =∂ ∂ . The reason was that, for path independence, ( ) x # needs to be the gradient of a potential function (i.e., there must exist a function ( )
Furthermore, the symmetry condition on derivatives is essentially necessary and sufficient for the existence of such a potential function (e.g., see Apostol, 1957, Theorems 10-38, 10-45 and 10-48) .
In the classical case of integrability, the potential function has the interpretation of an expenditure function. Path independence is the requirement that the incremental expenditure needed for an agent to attain a fixed level of utility, as the price vector changes from p A to p B , must not depend on the particular price adjustment path taken from p A to p B . Outside of economics, a better-known example of path independence is the analysis of a gravitational field in Newtonian mechanics. In a frictionless world, the amount of work required to move an object from point A to point B is the same along any possible path.
Thus, in the current auction context, path independence of the payment formula of Eq. (7) requires the existence of a potential function. With sincere bidding, the following important lemma shows that the potential function, ( ( ( )))
# , is associated with the crediting/debiting formula, implying path independence. For greater generality, the result is obtained using subgradients rather than gradients, so that Lemma 2 applies to both the continuous and discrete models: and equals: x p t dp t ∫ exists. Consequently, by integration by parts:
Let Γ denote the (piecewise smooth) curve in
. The integral on the right side of Eq. (9) may be rewritten as the line integral j x dp x dp V p T V p
and summing over all j ≠ i yields Eq. (8). !
THE DYNAMIC AUCTION GAME FOR DIVISIBLE COMMODITIES
The auction is modeled as a dynamic game in continuous time. There are n players. To simplify matters, we henceforth assume for the model of divisible commodities that utility functions, ( ) 
! denote any continuous function that is sign preserving in the sense that
. Price adjusts according to: 
The strategies in i Σ are similar in spirit to "Markovian" strategies in the sense that a player has full knowledge of the history of aggregate excess demands (or even of individual demands), yet the player chooses to base her demands only on the current time and price. This strategy space is restrictive enough to induce actions satisfying the hypothesis of Lemma 2, while general enough to include sincere bidding.
The auction is said to terminate at time T if The next lemma shows that, if all bidders bid sincerely, then starting from any history the auction converges to a Walrasian price vector. The proof is little more than the classical argument (see, for 12 Another sensible specification is that the observable history comprises the complete history of individual demands, i.e., { } will then be used is ex post perfect equilibrium, which requires that the strategy specified for each bidder at each node of the auction game would remain optimal if the bidder were to learn her opponents' types:
Ex Post Perfect Equilibrium. The strategy n-tuple { } 1 n i i σ = is said to comprise an ex post perfect equilibrium if for every time t, following any history Alternatively, we could have explicitly defined beliefs for each bidder, and stated the theorems of this paper in terms of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept. 15 However, stating the results in their current form gives them a number of additional desirable properties, e.g., the results are independent of the underlying distribution of bidders' types (see Maskin, 1992 , and Perry and Reny, 2001 . The results as stated also encompass the complete-information version of the model, as ex post perfect equilibrium reduces under complete information to the familiar equilibrium concept of subgame perfect equilibrium. 
In order for the auction to terminate at time T, given the opposing bidders' strategies of ( ( ))
Consequently, bidder i receives payoff of:
Since the expression within braces in Expression (13) However, without identical bidders, it obviously is not generally possible to select an initial price p(0) such that every bidder receives her VCG payoff. Theorem 3 nevertheless suggests a more intricate, parallel auction procedure that could be followed so that every bidder receives exactly her VCG payoff.
PARALLEL AUCTION GAME. Begin with any initial price (0) K p ∈ ! . We first perform the following n steps, which may be done in any order or may be run in parallel:
Step 1: Run the auction procedure of announcing a price p(t), allowing bidders j ≠ 1 to respond with quantities ( ) j x t while imposing 1 ( ) 0 x t = , and adjusting price according to Eq. (11) until a price 1 p − is determined at which the market (absent bidder 1) clears. …
Step n: Run the auction procedure of announcing a price p(t), allowing bidders j ≠ n to respond with quantities ( ) j x t while imposing ( ) 0 n x t = , and adjusting price according to Eq. (11) until a price n p − is determined at which the market (absent bidder n) clears.
Then, the auction is completed by continuing the auction from price n p − (and/or any of the other generated prices i p − ) with all bidders' demands now included:
Step n+1: Run the auction procedure of announcing a price p(t), allowing all bidders i = 1, … , n to respond with quantities ( ) i x t , and adjusting price according to Eq. (11) until a price * p is determined at which the market (with all bidders included) clears.
Finally, payoffs are computed as follows. The payment of bidder n is given by the crediting/debiting formula of Eq. (7), calculated along the path from n p − to * p . The payment of bidder i (1 ≤ i ≤ n-1) is also given by the crediting/debiting formula of Eq. (7), but is calculated along the union of three paths:
the path from i p − to p(0); the path from p(0) to n p − ; and the path from n p − to * p . Note that the first path (as well as all necessary demands) was generated in
Step i, the second path was generated in
Step n, and the third path was generated in Step n+1. PROOF. By Theorem 2, sincere bidding at each step i = 1, …, n is an equilibrium yielding a
Walrasian price vector : 0 for all 1,...,
bounded below by zero and bounded above by 1 ( ,..., )
In order to treat the case of discrete commodities, it will now be necessary for us to impose the substitutes condition. This condition, often known as "gross substitutes," 16 requires that if the prices of some commodities are increased while the prices of the remaining commodities are held constant, then a bidder's sincere demand weakly increases for each of the commodities whose prices were held constant.
The reason for requiring the substitutes condition in the discrete case is to assure the existence of 
The assumption in Definition 4 that each commodity is available in a supply of one is without loss of generality, since if there are multiple units of some commodities, one can expand the commodity space by treating each unit of a commodity as a unique item (Bikhchandani and Mamer, 1997 , Section 2).
The substitutes condition is defined with respect to this "unique items" formulation, since it is then a "sufficient and almost necessary" condition for the existence of Walrasian equilibrium. 18 The condition can be conveniently characterized in terms of the net indirect utility function: commodities are substitutes for bidder i if and only if ( ) i v # (as written in the unique items formulation) is submodular. 19 However, the auction procedure itself will be specified to allow multiple units of each discrete commodity. This provides a more compact way for bidders to communicate information, and is more naturally connected with both the traditional Walrasian auctioneer procedure and the divisible commodities treatment, above.
The substitutes condition is stronger than the concave utility assumption that we made above.
Substitutes preferences imply concave utility. However, let : (A2') Quasilinearity: The same as (A2).
(A3') Monotonicity: The function :
(A4') Substitutes condition: The preferences derived from :
Indeed, in the case of discrete items, given any one bidder with preferences violating the substitutes condition, it is possible to specify another bidder with additive preferences and an endowment of goods such that the resulting economy has no Walrasian equilibrium (Milgrom, 2000, Theorem 4) .
As before, the price vector will be denoted by 1 ( , ... , )
∈ ! , but it will soon be restricted to take nonnegative integer values at integer times. The demand correspondence, ( ) i Q p , is defined as before.
The auction is modeled as a dynamic game in discrete time. At each time t = 0, 1, 2, … , the variable, p(t), representing a price vector is announced to the n players. Each player i responds by demanding a set ( )
of one or more consumption bundles. The law of motion for the price variable will be specified later in this section.
H denote the part of the history of play prior to time t that is observable to player i at time t.
One sensible possibility is that the observable history comprises the complete history of demand profiles,
i.e.,
{ }
( ) : 0 and 1, ... ,
Given the price adjustment procedure that will be specified, this history conveys p(s) for all 0 s t ≤ ≤ . The strategy ( , )
function of times and observable histories : 2
. The strategy space Σ i is the set of all such functions ( , )
. As in the divisible goods game of Sections 5 and 6, the equilibrium concept will be ex post perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium that we will construct utilizes sincere bidding, which now means reporting the entire demand correspondence. This sincere bidding strategy will simply be denoted by ( ) i Q p , the same notation as for the demand correspondence.
While the logic behind classical Walrasian tâtonnement remains sound in a discrete environment, the Walrasian tâtonnement process of differential equation (11) and U(1,1) = c. At a price vector of (p , p), where 0 < p < c, each bidder would demand one of the goods, and so one good is in excess demand. Without loss of generality, say it is the first good, so its price must be increased. However, at a price vector of (p+ε , p), the aggregate demand for the first good drops to zero and for the second good jumps to three. Eq. (11) now requires the price of the second good instead to rise.
The choice of good whose price is required to increase may oscillate back and forth arbitrarily frequently.
In a recent article, Gul and Stacchetti (2000) provide an elegant procedure that circumvents this difficulty and thereby extends classical Walrasian tâtonnement to environments with discrete goods and substitute preferences. If agents bid sincerely by announcing their true demand correspondences at each price, the procedure is guaranteed to converge in finitely many steps to the lowest Walrasian equilibrium, and to get there via an ascending price path. While the Gul-Stacchetti procedure remains subject to the same critique as classical Walrasian tâtonnement -that if bidders possess any market power then the posited bidder behavior fails to be incentive compatible -it provides a needed input to adapt the auction framework of the current article to discrete goods. 
(T).
If it is, the auctioneer next calculates a minimal overdemanded set, {1, ... , } E K ⊂ , and the price adjustment process for times [ , 1) t T T ∈ + is then given by:
and bidders are next queried at time T+1. Meanwhile, if the set, {1 , ... , } K , is not overdemanded at p(T), then the auctioneer is guaranteed to be able to choose a feasible selection from
x p T = , and therefore the auction is deemed to end at p(T).
The price adjustment process specified in Eq. (14) 
The proof of Theorem 1′ is similar to the proof of Theorem 1; the only novelty occurs in two places. First, the price adjustment procedure specified in Eq. (14) yields a continuous, piecewise smooth price path, guaranteeing that Lemmas 1 and 2 continue to hold. Second, Observations 2 and 3 in the Appendix assure us that, despite the fact that the auctioneer receives demand reports from bidders at only a discrete sequence of price vectors, the auctioneer can nevertheless reconstruct a well-behaved profile of 21 The procedure in the Appendix departs from Gul and Stacchetti's (2000) procedure in several respects. First, the description and proof outlined in the Appendix of the current paper are elementary and do not require any knowledge of matroid theory. Second, whereas Gul and Stacchetti define their procedure for the "unique items" formulation, the current procedure is specified for the useful generalization where there may be multiple units of each "type" of commodity. Third, in step 2 of their procedure, Gul and Stacchetti (2000, p. 78) find it necessary to require the auction to end without trade if bidders ever make (insincere) reports in such a way that the excess demand set is not well defined. By contrast, the current procedure operates by making use of any minimal overdemanded set-which always exists-so there is never a need for such a punishment. Fourth, and probably most importantly, the current procedure is specified in such a way as to yield a continuous price path along which bidders' demands can be inferred at almost all points. Demand information along an entire price path is needed so that Eq. (7) can be used to calculate the bidders' payments.
optimal demands for all of the bidders, everywhere on the continuous price path, enabling Eq. (7) PROOF. The tâtonnement procedure will never select a commodity k whose price has already reached the lowest Walrasian price, since k can then never be an element of a minimal overdemanded set.
Since the price vector is integer valued and increases by only one at each step, and given Observation 1 in the Appendix, the price vector will never overshoot the lowest Walrasian price vector. Since the price adjustment process is increasing and at least one component of price increases by one at each step, any current price vector below the lowest Walrasian price vector will lead to the lowest Walrasian price vector in finite time. Given Observations 2 and 3 in the Appendix, the auctioneer always possesses sufficient information to carry out the procedure. Finally, we will argue that, with the substitutes condition, iterated weak dominance yields sincere bidding as the unique solution to the current auction. For brevity, we restrict attention to a version of the dynamic auction for discrete commodities of this section. 23 In addition to (A1') -(A4'), we assume: It facilitates the analysis to make the following modifications to the description of the dynamic auction. The complete proof of Theorem 5′ is omitted, since it is a straightforward generalization of the argument for homogeneous goods included in the revision of Ausubel (1997) . Consider any history at which the price equals ( , ... , ) p p . The auction must end after this period, so sincere bidding weakly dominates all other strategies. Next, suppose that after t iterations of weak dominance, all strategies other than sincere bidding have been eliminated for histories at which price satisfies
Consider any history at which
The auction must either end after this period or proceed to a history at which only sincere bidding is possible, so sincere bidding weakly dominates all other strategies. Conclusion (a) then follows by induction. Furthermore, with Assumption (A6'), sincere bidding is never eliminated, making sincere bidding the unique outcome of iterated weak dominance.
APPROXIMATIONS
One critique that can be made of Theorem 4 (and 4′) is that the exact result -a dynamic procedure that exactly replicates the VCG mechanism -generally requires the auctioneer to run a parallel auction procedure that generates n price paths (one corresponding to each bidder). Moreover, it may be feared that bidders will find it easy to manipulate the parallel auction, since bidder i's own payoff is not affected by steps j = 1, … , n , where j ≠ i. This short section will outline two approximations to the full procedure needed for Theorem 4. If applied in an environment with substitutes preferences, each approximation will generate only a single ascending price path, which is therefore payoff relevant to all bidders. However, there will be no attempt to prove that the outcomes of these two approximating procedures are approximately efficient; such an examination will be left for future laboratory experimentation or computer simulations.
The reader should recall that the purpose of the full parallel auction procedure was to determine the exact, theoretically correct price vector, p −i , at which the crediting/debiting calculation for each bidder i should commence. In principle, p −i should be the price vector at which the market clears, absent bidder i.
The key facet of each approximating procedure is to specify an alternative price vector at which credits and debits should begin to be computed involving bidder i (i = 1, …, n) and commodity
Both approximation approaches harken back to the "clinching" approach in Ausubel (1997) . In the first approximation, credits and debits continue to be calculated for bidder i using payment Eq. (7), but only in situations where the opposing bidders' aggregate demand for commodity k is less than the available supply, k S . Very simply, we have:
and modify the payment formula of Eq. (7) to be:
t dy t p t dy t
The second approximation looks at all of the commodities together, and asks when it has become a forgone conclusion that bidder i will win some commodities. To give this second approximation, we need first to specify an activity rule, a function which constrains a bidder's future bidding activity based on past bidding activity:
, where : Perry and Reny (2001) provide an affirmative answer to this question for my earlier efficient auction design treating homogeneous goods. They consider a model where each bidder receives a one-dimensional signal and where each bidder's valuation depends on the signals received by all n bidders. They show that: (1) with two bidders, the homogeneous goods auction leads to efficient outcomes with interdependent values; and (2) by allowing bidders to submit directed demands (one against each other bidder), it is possible to obtain efficient outcomes with interdependent values and n bidders.
I conjecture that essentially the same two steps can be replicated for the auction design herein.
That is, with interdependent values and two bidders, the efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities should also lead to efficient outcomes; and, again, by allowing bidders to submit directed demands (one against each other bidder), it should be possible to obtain efficient outcomes with interdependent values and n bidders.
At the same time, such a complication of the current auction design is not entirely in the spirit of the current paper. Even the n parallel auctions version of the current design has been critiqued as requiring excessive communication and for requesting bids that may be of minimal payoff relevance to the bidders making them. Avoiding these complications is the rationale behind the two single-trajectory approximations proposed in Section 8. Introducing directed demands into the design would be a further step in the direction of increasing the required communication and complicating the auction.
Despite their theoretical limitations, simple clean auction designs have distinct advantages over the more complicated mechanisms that are required for achieving full efficiency. These advantages are difficult to model formally and tend not to be treated in the existing literature. Nevertheless, the relatively simple designs of the predecessor and current papers seem likely to fare well on matters of cognitive simplicity and robustness. If bidders are easily able to understand the auction design, they seem more likely to bid consistently with equilibrium behavior. And if an auction design cleanly reflects intuitive first principles, it is more likely to perform robustly in environments somewhat different from stylized economic models.
The viewpoint of the predecessor paper for homogeneous goods has been that a good compromise between these competing considerations is to utilize an auction design that is dynamic (so as to give some recognition of value interdependencies) while still simple at every step. The heterogeneous commodities design of the current paper attempts to adhere to this philosophy as much as possible. By so doing, it aspires to introduce efficient auction procedures sufficiently transparent and robust that they might actually find themselves adopted into practical usage someday. ≠ . But then, bidder i cannot prefer y to x at price vector 1 E p + ∆ , unless 1 ∆ ≥ , a contradiction.
We now provide a minor variation on Gul and Stacchetti's price adjustment procedure. Given Observations 1-3, above, the auctioneer proceeds iteratively, as follows. At each time T = 0, 1, 2, … , the auctioneer announces an integer-valued price vector p, receives demand correspondence reports 1 { ( )} n i i
x p = , and determines a set of commodities E whose prices are incremented by 1 at time T+1. The set E is determined by a procedure somewhat simplifying that specified by Gul and Stacchetti (2000) . 
The nonempty set ( {1, ... , }) E E K ⊂ of commodities will be said to be overdemanded at price p if:
1T here exists 0 s.t. for every ( , ), there exists satisfying ( ) .
Furthermore, E will be said to be a minimal overdemanded set at p if E is overdemanded at p but no
Observe that, if E is overdemanded, then all supersets of E are also overdemanded. Hence, it is sufficient to check all subsets E′ formed by removing one element of E. This immediately giving us the following quick procedure, which also guarantees the existence of a minimal overdemanded set:
PROPOSITION A. For any report of demand correspondences by bidders in response to an integer price vector p, either the set {1, … , K} is not overdemanded or there exists at least one minimal overdemanded set.
PROOF. For any demand reports, begin with the set {1, … , K}. If it is overdemanded, then consider each subset of {1, … , K} formed by removing one element. If none of these subsets is overdemanded, then {1, … , K} is a minimal overdemanded set. Otherwise, select an overdemanded subset and iteratively repeat this process. Since the empty set ∅ is not overdemanded, the process must terminate with the discovery of a minimal overdemanded set. ! Section 7 of the paper goes on to show that, using the price adjustment equation (14) for a minimal overdemanded set E, the new auction procedure of this paper has analogous properties as we established in Sections 5 and 6 for the case of divisible commodities using Walrasian tâtonnement. To assist the reader in understanding the results, it may be helpful to make a distinction between where continuous time versus discrete time is being utilized. As Eq. (14) suggests, the price path and all payoff calculations continue to be specified in continuous time [0, ) t ∈ ∞ . This is done so that the payoff Eq. (7) and Lemmas 1 and 2 continue literally to hold. However, the auctioneer's price announcement and bidders' demand reports now only need to occur at discrete times 0,1, 2, ... t = . This simplification is possible in light of Observations 2 and 3, which establish, first, that sufficient information is reported at integer time T to guide price adjustment for the interval [T, T+1), and second, that sufficient information is reported at integer time T to deduce bidders' demands for the interval [T, T+1). Finally, Observation 1 assures that proceeding in integer steps will never lead us to overshoot the lowest Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
